Introduction
The British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) was founded in London in April 1960 and while it did not initiate anti-apartheid action in Britain, it brought together different activities in the aftermath of the Sharpeville Massacre of 21 March 1960 . The presence of many South African exiles and radical Anglican Churchmen in the United Kingdom (UK) led to a growing concern for South African racial issues in the period preceding Sharpeville. The Boycott Movement, the predecessor of the AAM, publicised apartheid, encouraged the boycott of South African products, and established links with political parties and concerned groups, which proved important for the AAM. The AAM was a broad-based movement which aimed to work with people from diverse backgrounds and all political parties. It used various strategies and focused on different aspects of apartheid. The AAM wanted to change British government policy, influence and inform British public opinion, and support the South African liberation movements. This article discusses one aspect of AAM anti-apartheid activity -campaigns in support of South African political prisoners and detainees and the attendant campaigns against human rights abuses. Through these campaigns, which became increasingly important in the later apartheid years, the AAM succeeded in attracting broader public support for anti-apartheid campaigns than would have been the case had it restricted itself to political debates. Human rights issues also succeeded, on occasion, in attracting support from the British government and other world organisations and allowed for the AAM to establish new networks. In this article, I
start by outlining the focus on human rights issues in the struggle against apartheid. The next section describes the development of the AAM campaign for political prisoners, firstly during the Rivonia Trial and then, in 1973, with the formation of 'Southern Africa: The Imprisoned Society (SATIS)'. Finally, I discuss campaigns taken up by SATIS in the period 1973 to 1980, and the start of the Campaign to free Nelson Mandela. Through analysing these campaigns it becomes clear that AAM support for all South African movements was not equal. The AAM increasingly favoured the African National Congress (ANC) over other South African liberation movements when choosing which political prisoners and human rights abuses around which to mobilise support. Furthermore, by considering the discussions around campaigns it is clear that the ANC was consulted more than other groups and that its priorities were emphasised. I suggest that while political prisoner and human rights campaigns proved highly successful in attracting support for the anti-apartheid struggle, this support became centred on the ANC as the primary South African liberation movement.
Human Rights and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle
Human rights issues were of particular importance in the international struggle against apartheid considering the prominence of these issues internationally and the possibility for the building of networks between anti-apartheid solidarity groups and other concerned movements. After the Second World War the focus on human rights increased world-wide and led to increased awareness of discrimination and just legal process. After the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations (UN) in 1948, there was an expectation that a regime, whatever its ideology, should adhere to certain, universal norms. It was in this international Well before the formation of the AAM and before the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) brought out a report condemning apartheid and informing the international community of its 'full legal and moral implications', issues of torture and imprisonment in South Africa were the subject of international attention.
3 But the Sharpeville Massacre was a turning-point and led to international condemnation of apartheid and public awareness of the reality of the South African situation. Much of the condemnation was based on human rights grounds. 4 In 1965 the UN drew up a document on the rights of arrested people inside South Africa, which it gave to the South African government, making the government aware that its treatment of prisoners did not conform to international norms. reluctant to lend direct support to the liberation movements. This was especially the case after 1979 when Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister. She was prepared, on occasion, to support specific campaigns to save the lives of political prisoners on death row or those in jail, but would not meet with the ANC and was critical of the armed struggle. Campaigns for political prisoners therefore, on occasion, gave the AAM direct access to the British government, despite the fact that the campaigns were not always successful in stopping hangings or imprisonment. The AAM tactic of focusing on prisoners, trials and human rights became increasingly important as the AAM tried to encourage government intervention and the moral rejection of apartheid. 16 The AAM found that emphasising individual cases stressed the violence of the South African regime and the level of resistance by its citizens. In attracting worldwide support in these battles against the state, international human rights norms increasingly came to be applied to the South African government and critics demanded that these norms be adhered to. The treatment of prisoners and wide use of torture and execution also negated South African government attempts at claiming reform by publicising continued repression inside the country. 22 At the end of the trial the ANC believed that world opinion would ensure freedom for the accused within a maximum of ten years. The South African government on the other hand believed that the men would be forgotten and that foreign supporters would abandon the cause. 23 The World Campaign continued to function and took up the cases of others on trial and publicised jail conditions, but after the conclusion of the Rivonia Trial the sense of urgency declined and the committee lost support. In 1967 there was an attempt to revive the group and it was placed under the umbrella of IDAF but, despite short-term success and new initiatives, the committee continued to face problems. In 1969 discussions on the future of the committee took place between the AAM, ANC and IDAF and it was decided to keep the committee independent from any specific solidarity or liberation movement. The AAM discussed individual efforts and formed a sub-committee. The political prisoner campaign had however lost its focus and prominence. 24 In 1973 the focus on political prisoners was revived. 38 The media coverage suggests that political prisoners were a popular issue as the AAM struggled to get media coverage at this time.
The World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners
However, public participation in 1974 suggests a drop in support, which is evidence of how difficult it was to keep an issue in the headlines -a problem the AAM experienced continually.
39
In 1976 the composition of SATIS began to change. In January staff changes occurred at the AAM office and Jennifer McClelland, full-time AAM Field Officer, suggested that the AAM office make more of the decisions regarding SATIS campaigns and organisation. Terry agreed to this suggestion because IDAF found it difficult to send representatives to meetings and was no longer playing as active a role. However, while SATIS increasingly came under the control of the AAM, IDAF continued to participate. In March Rica Hodgson, a South African exile, joined SATIS on behalf of IDAF. As a result of a drop in support, the AAM resolved to make SATIS's purpose clearer to those outside the movement and agreed that it should get a permanent section in the AAM's monthly publication, the Anti-Apartheid News, to discuss its actions. The newspaper became an important way of advertising and detailing SATIS campaigns. SATIS also recognised that it was not getting as much support as it had hoped from groups sympathetic to the AAM. It decided to emphasise its focus on human rights and its connection with the AAM which had a better developed support base.
By the end of the year it was clear that SATIS had managed to establish itself, and while support was difficult to sustain, the focus on political prisoners had been revived. The ANC did not initiate these internal developments, but it took action in the immediate aftermath. In this climate solidarity was particularly important for the ANC, which wanted to be recognised as an important player internally. It is clear that from this point SATIS drew closer to the ANC, a process that continued throughout the following decade. This is evident in the focus on ANC trials and actions and the close coordination with ANC activities and representatives.
Internal ANC activity also increased in this period, giving SATIS and the AAM the opportunity to focus on these developments and the increased number of detainees and prisoners connected to the ANC. James Sanders suggests that the AAM was concerned about the relative invisibility of the ANC in the coverage of the Soweto Uprisings and there was a re-examination of media relations. This was another reason for the increased media coverage of ANC political prisoners and detainees from 1977.
While support increased, suggesting that linking SATIS more directly to the AAM and emphasising human rights proved beneficial, the number of signatures collected was lower than in 1974. 42 Mike Terry agreed that an ANC representative would be beneficial to SATIS. In February 1977 when Albert Dlomo, an ANC ex-Robben Island prisoner, joined he expressed his hope that Dlomo would play an active role on the committee. 43 The involvement of an ANC representative, without similar representation for other liberation movements such as the PAC or BCM, influenced the direction of the SATIS committee. While SATIS did not focus purely on ANC political prisoners and detainees, they did get preference over those from other political persuasions. The ANC also came to play an important role in feeding information on internal developments to SATIS, which further impacted on its choice of campaign priorities.
The evolving relationship between the ANC and AAM was visible when representatives from the two groups met in June 1977 to discuss a campaign for the 'Pretoria 12', eleven men and one woman accused of assisting the underground structures of the ANC and accused under the Terrorism Act. 44 The prisoners declared that they had been tortured while in custody. 45 At a minimum, they faced a sentence of five years imprisonment, but they also faced the possibility of formal standing to question the judgement of a South African court. 60 However by October 1978
Owen had asked that the AAM keep him informed on developments and he associated the British government with an appeal to the South African government made by Shridath Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary General. 61 By the end of the year the British government had called for clemency.
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After all it was not South Africa's race laws, but its security laws, that prompted the Security
Council of the United Nations to order mandatory sanctions for the first time ever against a member state, when it directed states to impose an arms embargo on South Africa
These developments suggest that focusing on the death penalty (which was outlawed in the UK in 1965) and human rights issues more broadly had a particular effect on British opinion. Mahlangu claimed not to have killed the men in question and also raised issues regarding police torture and the independence of the judiciary. The change in government opinion indicates that international views, expressed here through the Commonwealth, and public protest affected the government's stand. For SATIS, it was a great achievement to succeed in attracting government support, even if it was limited to one issue.
The Mahlangu campaign was not just a political campaign to increase support for the struggle, but a campaign focused on an individual. It showed how the AAM focused on human rights violations in order to attract greater public support, a strategy that proved successful. As
Dugard noted: 63 It is clear that the AAM and SATIS were able to attract greater support for the anti-apartheid struggle when focusing on human rights issues. The British government was reluctant, even under Labour, to offer direct support to the liberation struggle. Similarly, much of the British public did not involve itself in general anti-apartheid campaigns, possibly because they felt they did not have enough knowledge on political issues. However, the AAM was able to attract support for campaigns focused more directly on human rights issues. While completely separating political issues from human rights issues was neither possible nor pragmatic, a greater focus on the human element proved particularly successful. Similarly, the Mandela Campaign, as
we shall see below, focused on an individual. Once support had been harnessed for his release, it was possible to expand the campaign to include discussions on political ideology and the standpoint of the ANC. Furthermore, analysis of the campaigns organised by SATIS in the 1970s, as well as their mode of organisation, reflects growing AAM and SATIS support for the ANC over other liberation movements. The ANC formed closer ties with the AAM than any other liberation movement did, and in return the focus of political prisoner campaigns shifted towards the ANC. Through these campaigns, the ANC and its political ideology were publicised.
Mandela's Sixtieth Birthday
The international campaign which focused on Nelson Mandela became one of the biggest and most successful AAM initiatives ever embarked on. The campaign succeeded in, not only making Mandela well known to the majority of the British population, but also in increasing support for the ANC and for the struggle against apartheid. The success of the campaign rested largely of the fact that it was able to attract supporters from different political persuasions, those not politically aware, and the youth.
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The 1978 celebration for Mandela's sixtieth birthday signalled a new focus on him, although it was only in the 1980s that the campaign really took root as a focal point of international anti-apartheid activity. The AAM gave direction to the celebrations. It is clear that the Mandela campaign focused on human rights as well as political issues.
By emphasising Mandela's incarceration and police brutality against his wife, broader public support was harnessed. However, at the same time his words and actions were used to publicise the actions and ideology of the ANC and to inform people about apartheid. It was also through
Mandela that the armed struggle, which remained a contentious issue internationally, could be addressed more easily. The AAM continued to argue that changing government policy was important, but it believed change would be brought about through the mobilisation of the wider population. The These campaigns proved effective in attracting support from those who preferred not to become politically aligned but who were socially aware, and provided the basis for the AAM to establish more diverse networks. However, while solidarity campaigns which focused attention of human rights and individual prisoners proved highly successful in increasing support for the struggle against apartheid, these campaigns were not non-aligned. Through its close relationship with the ANC, and by focusing on prisoners and detainees connected to the ANC, the AAM also brought the focus towards the ANC and publicised it above other anti-apartheid organisations.
